Consumption Behavior, Annuity Income and Mortality Risk of Retirees by Kutlu-Koc, Vesile et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Consumption Behavior, Annuity Income and Mortality Risk of Retirees





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2017
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Kutlu-Koc, V., Alessie, R., & Kalwij, A. (2017). Consumption Behavior, Annuity Income and Mortality Risk of
Retirees. Economist-Netherlands, 165(3), 349-380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-017-9301-z
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
De Economist (2017) 165:349–380
DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9301-z
Consumption Behavior, Annuity Income and Mortality
Risk of Retirees
Vesile Kutlu-Koc1 · Rob Alessie2 · Adriaan Kalwij3
Published online: 15 June 2017
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract Previous empirical studies have found that individuals do not draw down
their assets after retirement which is at odds with the predictions of a simple life cycle
model without uncertainty. Hurd (Econometrica 57(4):779–813, 1989; Mortality risk
and consumption by couples, 1999) explains such saving behavior of retired singles
and couples by adding lifetime uncertainty to the simple life cycle model. We tested
whether predictions about consumption during retirement of this extended life cycle
model hold for a sample of older Americans. We used data from the Health and
Retirement Study supplemented with data from the Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey. In line with theory we found that, on average, total consumption is greater than
their annuity income after retirement and that this difference increases with the level of
initial wealth. For older singles but not for couples our results suggest that, as predicted
by the extended theoretical model of Hurd, the on average negative consumption
growth decreases with higher mortality rates.
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1 Introduction
A simple life cycle model without uncertainty predicts that rational agents’ level
of consumption is determined by their lifetime income. Under the assumption that
individuals’ annual earned income is greater than their annual retirement income, this
model implies that individuals save when they are young and draw down their assets
after retirement. Studies such as Poterba et al. (2011) and Van Ooijen et al. (2015)
have shown that the prediction of declining wealth with increasing age is not supported
by the empirical evidence. Even for people at advanced ages these studies found no
evidence in favor of wealth decumulation. Various extensions of the simple life cycle
model have been developed to explain this inconsistency. Hurd (1989, 1999) explained
saving behavior of elderly singles and couples by adding uncertainty about the date of
death and bequest motives. Hubbard et al. (1994) found that when uncertainty about
lifetime earnings and out-of-pocket medical expenditures are taken into account, the
predictions of the model matched the observed trajectories of wealth and consumption
more closely. Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) assumed that the individuals’ marginal
utility of consumption is affected by their health status and, therefore, in their model
individuals become consumption constrained due to deteriorating health in old age
and, therefore, individuals do not take up (all) their savings.
This paper’s main contribution to the literature is that it empirically tests the pre-
dictions of the life cycle models proposed by Hurd (1989, 1999) by analyzing data
on consumption. Hurd (1989) derives a model of consumption with mortality risk
and bequest motives for retired singles who enter the retirement phase with positive
wealth. His model without a bequest motive predicts that the (negative) growth rate of
consumption decreases as the mortality rate increases as higher mortality rates make
people more impatient and increase current consumption at the expense of future con-
sumption. Moreover, this model predicts that wealth declines with age after retirement.
This prediction implies that annuity income never exceeds consumption.
Hurd (1999) also developed a theoretical model to explain the consumption behavior
of elderly couples. His model takes into account the mortality risk of both spouses,
allows for bequest motives and predicts that the (negative) growth rate of consumption
declines at a faster rate as the mortality risk of the couple increases at advanced ages.
Hurd’s (1999) model for couples has not been empirical tested in previous stud-
ies. The theoretical life cycle model for couples also predicts that, unless individuals
have a strong bequest motive, annuity income never exceeds consumption. We empir-
ically test this prediction both for singles and couples by using 5 waves (2000, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2008) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) supplemented with the
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS). We test as well the theoretical
prediction that a higher the level of initial wealth is associated with a larger difference
between total consumption and annuity income.
Next, we test the prediction regarding consumption growth and mortality risk for
elderly singles as well as for elderly couples. For elderly singles this prediction has
already been tested by Salm (2010). He only used the 2000 and 2002 wave of the HRS.
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His results confirm the validity of the model of Hurd (1989): consumption growth for
elderly singles decreases by 1.8% point when the subjective mortality rate increases
by 1% point. We will check whether the results of Salm still hold if one takes more
recent waves of the HRS into account. We adapt the life cycle model for couples
proposed by Hurd (1999) in such a way it can be brought to the data. In particular, our
adaption allows for a solution for consumption growth which is independent of the
widower’s and the widow’s marginal utilities of wealth and results in a model that can
be estimated directly using the subjective survival probabilities of both the husband
and wife.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical models. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the estimation
results, and Sect. 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Models
2.1 The Singles Model
Hurd (1989) analyzes a consumption model with mortality risk and bequest motives
for elderly singles. As mentioned above, we do not model employment and retirement
decisions and focus on the retirement phase of individuals. Households enter retire-
ment with a non-negative amount of assets. They moreover receive annuity income to
finance consumption during retirement. Annuities are predetermined at retirement and
real annuity income per year is assumed to be constant over time and denoted by y.
Mortality risk is the only source of uncertainty. In order to fully understand the model
of Hurd, we have to introduce some notation. Let aυτ be the probability that a person
survives until age τ given that he/she is alive at age υ (τ ≥ υ) and mυτ the probability
that a person is dead at age τ given that he/she is alive in at age υ. Suppose that
the retirement phase starts at age R and lasts at most until L , the maximum age after
which the person dies with certainty, i.e. mLL+1 = 1. Hurd (1989) assumes that the con-
sumers maximize in each period t of the retirement phase (t ∈ {1, . . . , L + 1 − R})
the following expected intertemporal utility function1:
L+1−R∑
τ=t
(1+ρ)t−τ aR+t−1R+τ−1u (cτ )+
L+1−R∑
τ=t
(1+ρ)t−1−τ m R+t−1R+τ V ((1 + r) Aτ ) (1)
where r denotes the real interest rate, ρ the rate of time preference, cτ consumption
in period τ (at age R + τ − 1) and Aτ net worth (bequeathable wealth) at the end of
period τ . The within period utility function u (.) is assumed to be strictly concave and
increasing in its argument. V (.) denotes the utility from a bequest and it is increasing
in Aτ .
The first term in Eq. (1) is the expected discounted utility from consumption. The
second term is the expected discounted utility from leaving a bequest. The utility of
leaving a bequest is a function of the net worth at the beginning of period τ + 1, i.e.
1 t = 1 denotes the start of the retirement phase, i.e. in period 1 the individual is R years old.
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(1 + r) Aτ . The intertemporal utility function in Eq. (1) is maximized subject to the
following asset accumulation constraints and the liquidity constraints:
Aτ = (1 + r) Aτ−1 + y − cτ , τ = 1, . . . , L + 1 − R (2a)
Aτ ≥ 0, τ = 1, . . . , L + 1 − R (2b)
where y is non-capital income (in real terms), consisting only of annuities. Equa-
tion (2b) states that individuals cannot borrow without collateral. In other words,
individuals cannot borrow against future Social Security or pension income. Conse-
quently, private wealth and annuity wealth are not perfect substitutes.
If we ignore the liquidity constraints (2b), the first order condition of this maxi-
mization can be written as (t ∈ {1, . . . , L − R}):
u′ (ct ) = 1 + r1 + ρ
((
1 − m R+t−1R+t
)
u′ (ct+1) + m R+t−1R+t V ′ ((1 + r) Aτ )
)
(3)
where u′ (.) is the marginal utility of consumption in period t , and V ′ (.) is the marginal
utility of leaving a bequest in period t . Equation (3) is an Euler equation that describes
the allocation of resources over time under lifetime uncertainty. In the case of a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, i.e. u (ct ) = c
1−γ
t
1−γ , and no bequest motive





= 1 + r
1 + ρ
(
1 − m R+t−1R+t
)
, (4)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. After taking the natural logarithm
of both sides, Eq. (4) can be rewritten as











1 − m R+t−1R+t
)
, (5)
where  ln ct+1 = ln ct+1 − ln ct .
Equation (5) shows that consumption growth increases with a higher real interest
rate and that it decreases with a higher rate of time preference and a higher subjective
mortality rate. Consumption growth is negative if individuals are impatient (ρ > r )
since they prefer consuming today rather than consuming tomorrow. Since the mor-
tality rate increases exponentially with age, individuals behave even more impatient
as they become older and, accordingly, their consumption declines at a faster rate.
Individuals who are relatively more risk averse will have a flatter than average con-
sumption profile and their consumption will decline at a relatively slower rate with
increasing age.
This model assumes that individuals enter the retirement period with a positive
amount of assets and, therefore, are not liquidity constrained at the beginning of the
retirement period. However, they draw down their assets as they consume more than
their annuity income and may become constrained after some time when having drawn
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Fig. 1 Consumption and (private) wealth in a model without bequests for different levels of initial wealth
(R = 65, y = 0.2; r = ρ = 0.001; γ = 3)
down their assets to zero at a certain period t∗ (Aτ = 0, τ = t∗, . . . , L + 1 − R).
In that case, consumption will be equal to annuity income from t∗ onward. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
The flat line in this figure stands for the constant annuity stream after retirement. As
a result, this model predicts that consumption is never smaller than annuity income,
(ct > y). This prediction still holds if we would add additional uncertainty to the model
such as uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical expenses (De Nardi et al. 2010).
However, if people have a (strong) bequest motive, consumption may not exceed
annuity income. This latter prediction may as well not hold when the marginal utility
of consumption depends on health status (Börsch-Supan and Stahl 1991). This figure
also shows that different consumption profiles can be obtained for different levels of
initial wealth. The level of consumption is an increasing function of initial wealth and
the difference between total consumption and annuity income depends on the level
of initial wealth, i.e. the higher the initial wealth, the bigger this difference is. The
wealth-age profile is much steeper for a high level of initial wealth which suggests that
at the early stage of the retirement phase consumption is considerably larger than the
annuity income. The wealth-age profile is rather flat for a low level of initial wealth
and individuals draw down their assets at a relatively slow rate.
2.2 The Couples Model
Hurd (1999) proposes a consumption model with mortality risk and bequest motives
for elderly couples. In this model a couple receives utility from consumption and
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from leaving bequests. There are two types of bequests. The remaining wealth is first
transferred to the surviving spouse and after the death of the surviving spouse the by
then remaining wealth is inherited by children or others. This model is an extension
of the singles model and all assumptions of the singles model are maintained. Both
spouses are retired and t = 1 denotes the first period that both spouses are retired. We
allow for an age difference between the husband and wife and at t = 1 the husband
has age Rm and the wife has age R f . R∗ and R˜ denote the ages of the oldest and
youngest spouse, respectively: R∗ = max (Rm, R f
)
and R˜ = min (Rm, R f
)
. The
retired couple maximizes the following expected utility function starting from period
t onwards until the certain time of death of the surviving spouse, L +1− R˜. We allow
for different mortality rates between men and women but assume that the maximum
age after which the person dies with certainty, L , is the same for men and women. In
each period t of the retirement phase (t ∈ {1, . . . , L + 1 − R}) households maximize
the following expected intertemporal utility function:
L+1−R∗∑
τ=t
(1 + ρ)t−τ a˜tτ u (cτ ) +
L+1−Rm∑
τ=t








(1 + ρ)t−1−τ mˇtτ+1V ((1 + r) Aτ ) , (6)
where u (cτ ) is the couple’s utility from consumption, M ((1 + r) Aτ ) is the widower’s
utility of wealth, F ((1 + r) Aτ ) is the widow’s utility of wealth and V (.) is the utility
from leaving a bequest. The probability that both spouses will be alive in period τ








where m˜tt+1 is the instantaneous mortality rate of the couple which is the probability
that one of the spouses dies at the beginning of period t+1 given that both spouses were
alive in the previous period. This probability, is the sum of mortality risk of the wife,
w
R f +t
R f +t+1, and mortality risk of the husband, h
Rm+t
Rm+t+1, minus the probability that both
spouses die in period t + 1 given that both spouses were alive in the previous period:




R f +t+1 · h
Rm+t
Rm+t+1. (6b)
This equation shows that we assume that the death of the husband is independent of the
death of the wife. Notice that the instantaneous mortality rate of the couple depends
on the ages of husband (Rm + t) and wife (R f + t) in the period t . In Eq. (6) w˜tτ+1
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denotes the probability that the husband becomes a widower, i.e. the wife dies and the











R f +τ+1 − w
R f +τ









R f +t+1 − w
R f +t




for τ = t. (6c)
Likewise, h˜tτ+1 is the probability that the wife becomes a widow at the beginning of









h Rm+τRm+τ+1 − w
R f +τ




for τ > t,
h˜tt+1 =
(
h Rm+tRm+t+1 − w
R f +t




for τ = t. (6d)
























for τ = t. (6e)
The utility function in Eq. (6) is maximized subject to the asset accumulation
constraints and the liquidity constraints as introduced in the singles problem:
Aτ = (1 + r) Aτ−1 + yτ − cτ , τ = t, . . . , L + 1 − R˜, (7a)
Aτ ≥ 0, τ = t, . . . , L + 1 − R˜. (7b)
The solution of this model depends on the widower’s marginal utility of wealth
M ′ ((1 + r) Aτ ) and the widow’s marginal utility of wealth F ′ ((1 + r) Aτ ) (Hurd
1999; equation 5, p. 16). In order to estimate this model, one should explicitly define
these marginal utilities. We specify the unitary model proposed by Hurd (1999) some-
what further by making explicit assumptions about economies of scale (equivalence
scale) and about the widow(er)’s utility of wealth. This model allows us to find a
solution which is independent of the widower’s and the widow’s marginal utilities of
wealth so that it can be estimated directly using the subjective survival probabilities of
the husband and the wife. In our model the couple maximizes the following expected
utility function starting from the beginning of the retirement phase, t = 1, until the
certain time of death of the surviving spouse, t = L + 1 − R˜:
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L+1−R∗∑
τ=t






















shows the couple’s utility from consumption divided by the ‘square
root’ equivalent scale (OECD 2008). M ((1 + r) Aτ ) is the widower’s utility of
wealth which we assume to be equal to
∑L+1−Rm
k=τ+1 (1 + ρ)τ+1−k am,Rm+τ+1Rm+k u (cτ )
and, likewise, we assume that the widow’s utility of wealth F ((1 + r) Aτ ) equals∑L+1−R f
k=τ+1 (1 + ρ)τ+1−k a
f,R f +τ+1
R f +k u (cτ ). Notably, we make the assumption under-
lying the unitary model that the within period utility function is the same for couples,
widows and widowers. Admittedly, this is a strong assumption which makes it possible
to derive a relatively simple expression for the Euler equation (see below). The utility
function in Eq. (8) is maximized subject to the asset accumulation constraints and the
liquidity constraints in (7a) and (7b).
In case of no bequest motive to the children or others and no liquidity constraints,

























where m˜tt+1 is the instantaneous mortality rate of the couple as defined in Eq. (6b).
w˜tt+1is the probability that the husband becomes a widower at the beginning of period
t + 1 (see Eq. 6c). Similarly, h˜tt+1 is the probability that the wife becomes a widow at
the beginning of period t + 1 (see Eq. 6d).
















After taking the natural logarithm of both sides, Eq. (10) can be written as:
















1−γ (h˜tt+1 + w˜tt+1
)))
(11)









couple’s mortality rate and one can show that it is positive as long as the coefficient of
2 Hurd (1999, p. 16) points out that the Euler equation does not include the marginal utility of leaving a
bequest to the children since the probability that both spouses die in the near future is close to zero.
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risk aversion is larger than one and it increases with an increase in the mortality rates
of the wife and the husband. Equation (11) shows, therefore, that the consumption
growth of a couple declines with an increase in the couple’s mortality rate when they
become older. In the empirical part of this paper we take Eq. (11) as starting point of
our analysis. We assume that the coefficient of risk aversion is equal to three, which is
a reasonable value obtained by the previous studies (e.g. Palumbo 1999), and calculate
the couple’s mortality rate accordingly. In this case the couple’s mortality rate is equal















The HRS is a biennial panel survey of Americans and its respondents were first inter-
viewed in 1992 (Juster and Suzman 1995). The HRS is well-suited for the purpose
of our study since it is a large sample of elderly population and it includes detailed
information on employment status, annuity income, household wealth, marital sta-
tus, subjective survival probabilities, and health status of the respondents and their
spouses. The data on consumption come from the Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey (CAMS) which is a supplemental survey to the HRS. In 2001 the CAMS sur-
vey sent questionnaires to a subsample of the households who were interviewed in the
HRS 2000 core survey. If household members are married or have a partnership, the
questionnaire was sent to one of the spouses, selected randomly. In the initial wave of
the CAMS survey 3866 households answered questions about household spending in
26 categories of nondurables and six categories of durables (see Hurd and Rohwedder
2008 for details). This survey has smaller number of households than the HRS and
covers the period from 2001 to 2011.
We have used five waves of the CAMS survey covering the years 2001–2009. The
CAMS survey was matched to most of the information in the previous HRS wave,
i.e. CAMS 2001 was matched to the HRS 2000. However, information on financial
variables such as wealth and income has been obtained from the next HRS wave. For
example, HRS 2002 has information on total income for the year 2001 which coincides
with the information on consumption in CAMS 2001.3
Individuals’ annuity income (before-tax) has been defined as the sum of income
from employer pension and/or annuity, social security disability, supplemental secu-
rity income, social security retirement, spouse or widow benefits, unemployment and
worker’s compensation, and other income including veteran’s benefits, welfare and
food stamps. After-tax annuity income was obtained by deducting total taxes paid (fed-
eral taxes, state taxes, and the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax which
includes social security tax and Medicare tax) from before-tax annuity income. Federal
taxes, state income taxes, and the FICA tax for each household in each year have been
3 We excluded CAMS 2011 from our analysis as HRS 2012 was not available when we carried out our
analysis.
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calculated based on the NBER tax calculator TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts 1993).
Given respondents background characteristics such as their marital status, income
from all sources, deductions etc., this program calculated the tax liabilities for each
household in our sample.4
To measure individuals’ mortality risks we use subjective mortality rates instead
of life table mortality rates because of two reasons. First, life table mortality rates
do not show much individual variation since they are aggregated and allow only for
differences by age, gender and race, while subjective mortality rates are on an indi-
vidual level. Previous studies have shown that subjective mortality rates are correlated
with individual characteristics such as level of education, wealth, and income, as well
as behavioral factors such as smoking, alcohol consumption and obesity (Hurd and
McGarry 2002). Consequently, subjective mortality rates are more informative about
individuals’ mortality rates than life table mortality rates. For instance, smokers may
know they are likely to die earlier than an average person in the population and behave
accordingly. In this case, life table mortality rates may not predict smokers’ saving and
consumption decisions well. Second, individuals may make decisions based on their
beliefs of survival and these beliefs do not necessarily have to be the same as objective
survival rates. While deviations of subjective from objective survival rates would yield
suboptimal decisions, they may more actuarily explain observed behavior.
Subjective mortality rates for each respondent and his/her spouse (if present) are
calculated in each wave from 2000 to 2008 based on a question about individuals’
probability of survival to a certain age. The question is:
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that you think there is
absolutely no chance and “100” means that you think the event is absolutely sure
to happen…What is the percent chance that you will live to be 80/85/90/95/100)
or more?5
Hurd and McGarry (2002) have shown that these probabilities are good predictors
of individuals’ actual mortality within a sample, i.e. individuals who expect to live
longer are less likely to die. Following Gan et al. (2003) and Salm (2010) we derived
annual subjective mortality rates by assuming that individuals’ subjective mortality
rate (mτ−1i,τ ) is proportionate to the life table mortality rate (mτ−10,τ ) as follows:
mτ−1i,τ = ξi mτ−10,τ , τ = t + 1, t + 2, . . . , L + 1 (12)
Under this assumption, the subjective probability si,t,T of individual i to survive










1 − ξi mτ0,τ+1
) (13)
4 For more information see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=shownews3x1&hfyle=news198.
5 The target age is always more than ten years above the respondents’ current age.
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This method does not produce meaningful mortality factors if individuals reported
zero or one answers to probability of survival to age T . For this reason, we recoded
the probability responses 0 and 1 to, respectively, 0.01 and 0.99 (see e.g Salm 2010).
Life table mortality rates are taken from race, gender, and age specific life-tables of
National Vital Statistics Reports which are available for the years from 2000 to 2008.
3.1 Sample Selection
The CAMS survey has questions about household spending which are answered by the
respondents who also participated in the HRS core survey in 2000. If two respondents
are married or have a partnership, one of the spouses has been selected randomly to
answer the questions about household spending. We started with an unbalanced panel
sample which includes households who answered questions in the CAMS survey at
least one time in the period from 2001 to 2009. We restricted the sample to 3615
households in which the respondent and, if present, his/her spouse are aged 65 and
over. By age 65 most individuals are retired and at age 65 individuals become eligible
for Medicare. Nevertheless, as also observed in the data, some individuals have income
from earnings after age 65. Since our study focuses on retired individuals, we therefore
further restricted our sample to 3264 households in which the respondent and, if
present, his/her spouse do not earn any wage income.
Next, we selected individuals who are not liquidity constrained in the sense that they
hold positive amount of household wealth in the first year they entered the survey. This
restriction is necessary because the models of Sect. 2 assume no liquidity constraints
and our sample is selected accordingly to be able to test the models’ predictions. After
excluding households with zero or negative wealth holdings, we are left with 3033
households.
Finally, we selected the 2428 households which are one or two-person households.
For the one-person household, the household size is equal to one and the household
member is separated/divorced/widowed or never married. We refer to such households
as singles. For the two-person household, the household size is equal to two and the
household members are married or living with a partner. No children or other per-
sons are present in these selected household. We refer to such households as couples.
Some couples may have become singles during the observation period as a result of
divorce, separation or the death of the spouse and our theoretical model of Sect. 2
allows for such a transition. However, as it does not match our models of Sect. 2, we
removed 50 singles who became couples during the observation period, e.g. because
of a (re)marriage. Missing information on subjective survival probabilities caused a
further exclusion of 283 households and missing information on the change in non-
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durable consumption caused a further exclusion of 941 households. Our final sample
includes 1154 households and 3692 household-year observations.
3.2 Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the sample mean, median and standard deviation of financial vari-
ables for both singles and couples. Total consumption is the sum of durables and
nondurables excluding spending on cars and mortgages.6 Categories of durable con-
sumption include refrigerator, washer/dryer, dishwasher, television, and computer and
categories of nondurables are home insurance, property tax, rent, electricity, water,
heat, home repair services, phone/cable/internet, auto insurance, health insurance,
house/yard supplies, home repair supplies and services, food, dining out, clothing,
gasoline, vehicle services, drugs, health services, medical supplies, vacations, tick-
ets, hobbies, contributions, and gifts. Total consumption, after-tax annuity income,
total net household wealth, total net financial wealth, and total health expenditures
are measured at the household level. Total net household wealth excludes Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and the value of 401k/Keogh plans and it is defined as
the sum of all wealth components less all debt. The wealth components are the value
of the primary residence, real estate, vehicles, stocks, checking accounts, government
bonds, bonds, other wealth and the debt components are mortgages, home loans and
other debt. Total net financial wealth does not include the value of the primary res-
idence, real estate, mortgages, and home loans. Total health expenditures consist of
expenditures on drugs, health services, medical supplies, and health insurance.
According to Table 1, there is a difference between sample mean and median values
for some variables such as total consumption, wealth, and financial wealth which may
suggest that some households have very high levels of wealth and/or consumption. The
mean ratio of wealth to annuity income is 17, which suggests that the sample has very
wealthy households. The ratio of total consumption to annuity income is larger than
one. The variable “I (total consumption ≥ annuity income)” is an indictor function
that takes one if total consumption is greater than or equal to after-tax annuity income
and zero otherwise.
Table 2 shows the sample mean, median, and standard deviation of the variables used
in the estimation of the Euler equation (Eq. 5) for singles. We focus on nondurable
consumption categories because these are easier to adjust for consumers compared
to durable consumption categories. Some of the nondurable expenditures such as
home insurance, property tax, rent, electricity, water, heat, and auto insurance are
essential for individuals and we may not expect that they change in response to changes
in the subjective mortality risk. Medical expenditures can be seen as an investment
in health and may not provide direct utility to individuals. Salm (2010) used seven
categories of nondurables which are food, dining out, clothing, gasoline, vacations,
6 These two spending categories contain components of savings. Individuals were asked to report total
mortgage payments and total car payments which include both interest and principal. To find a pure spending
measure for these two components, one needs to remove the saving component from the payments by
subtracting the principle. Since the CAMS survey does not include information on principal and interest
separately, we could not calculate the pure spending measures for these components.
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Table 1 Summary statistics (one-person or two-person households)
Mean Median SD
Total consumption (in 2003 dollars) 23,380 18,950 17,240
Annuity income (in 2003 dollars) 18,330 16,090 13,120
Wealth (in 2003 dollars) 289,240 156,730 590,680
Financial wealth (in 2003 dollars) 151,010 47,510 356,180
Total health expenditures (in 2003 dollars) 3510 2610 4100
Wealth/annuity income 17.243 8.37 41.474
Financial wealth/annuity income 8.974 2.418 27.982
Total consumption/annuity income 1.632 1.133 2.119
Total consumption minus annuity income 0.498 0.206 2.017
I (total consumption ≥ annuity income) 0.587 1 0.492
Age of the household respondent 74.827 75 6.426
Male 0.324 0 0.468
Number of observations (households) 3692 (1154)
The financial variables measured at the household level and are divided by the OECD-modified equivalence
scale (Hagenaars et al. 1994)





Nondurable consumption (Salm 2010
categories)
5911 4666 5820






Subjective mortality rate 0.058 0.034 0.055
Life table mortality rate 0.047 0.039 0.03
Age 76.809 77 6.582
Male 0.212 0 0.408
Poor health 0.266 0 0.442
Good health 0.4 0 0.49
Years of education 12.517 12 2.475
Any ADL limitations 0.177 0 0.382
Any IADL limitations 0.369 0 0.482
CES-D score 1.566 1 1.877
Number of observations (households) 1323 (646)
(1) All amounts are in 2003 dollars
(2) Annual growth rates are reported
(3) The number of observations takes into account that the estimation of the Euler equation requires at least
two observations per household
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tickets, hobbies. The latter categories are more easily adjusted in the short term if
needed. In the empirical part of the study we consider both all categories and the
categories of nondurables used by Salm (2010). Notice that that average nondurable
consumption growth is negative. Under the assumption that the average individual is
impatient, this result is in line with the singles model of Hurd if one ignores a bequest
motive (cf. Eq. 5).
Good health is a binary indicator equal to one if individuals’ self-rated health sta-
tus is excellent and very good, and zero otherwise. Similarly, poor health is a binary
variable which is equal to one if individual’s self-reported health is fair or poor, and
zero otherwise. “Any ADL limitations” is a binary variable which shows whether
individuals have any difficulty in activities of daily living such as eating, bathing,
walking across a room, dressing, getting in and out of bed, and using the toilet. The
variable “Any IADL limitations” indicates whether individuals have any difficulty in
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living task such as using a telephone, taking med-
ication, handling money, shopping for groceries, preparing meals, and using a map.
The score on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) is a mental
health index which is commonly used by psychologists as well as economists (Hao
2008; Finkelstein et al. 2008). The CES-D ranges from 0 to 8 and it is the sum of six
negative indicators (depression, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, felt alone, felt
sad, could not get going) minus two positive indicators (felt happy and enjoyed life);
the higher the score, the more negative the respondent’s feelings were in the past week.
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation of the Euler
equation (Eq. 11) for couple households. Average non-durable consumption growth
is also negative for couples as predicted by the couples model (assuming ρ ≥ r , see
Eq. 11).
Table 4 reports the levels of total consumption and nondurables consumption across
years. According to this table, on average, both total and nondurables consumption
have decreased over the years 2001–2009. The decline in consumption from 2007 to
2009 could, in part, be driven by the financial crisis which has affected the income
and wealth of many people.
Table 5 reports the sample mean of a binary variable equal to one if total con-
sumption is greater than or equal to after-tax annuity income, and zero otherwise, by
different age groups. According to this table, for the majority of respondents, total
consumption is greater than their annuity income, although there are some differences
across years. For example, in 2009 we find that most respondents in the age groups
65–69 spent less than their annuity income. The reduction in consumption in this par-
ticular year could reflect the effect of the global financial crisis. Due to a strong stock
market decline in 2009 individuals who just entered retirement might have experi-
enced a loss in their financial assets, which could have caused them to consume less
than their annuity income.
4 Estimation Results
The models outlined in Sect. 2 predict that total consumption is larger than annuity
income and that this difference increases with an increase in the level of initial wealth
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Table 3 Summary statistics (two-person households)
Mean Median SD
Nondurable consumption (all categories) 34,156 27,996 23,509
Nondurable consumption (Salm 2010 categories) 10,764 8870 8349
Nondurable consumption growth rate (all categories) −0.038 −0.023 0.254
Nondurable consumption growth rate (Salm 2010 categories) −0.051 −0.052 0.318
Husband’s subjective mortality rate 0.053 0.034 0.049
Wife’s subjective mortality rate 0.041 0.025 0.045
The couple’s mortality rate, subjectivea 0.048 0.033 0.037
The couple’s mortality rate from the life tablea 0.04 0.034 0.02
Age_husband 75.78 75 5.216
Age_wife 73.29 73 5.034
Poor health_husband 0.224 0 0.417
Poor health_wife 0.199 0 0.4
Good health_husband 0.434 0 0.495
Good health_wife 0.441 0 0.496
Years of education_husband 12.99 12 3.116
Years of education_wife 12.79 12 2.311
Any ADL limitations_husband 0.111 0 0.314
Any ADL limitations_wife 0.119 0 0.324
Any IADL limitations_husband 0.344 0 0.475
Any IADL limitations_wife 0.263 0 0.44
CES-D score_husband 0.766 0 1.249
CES-D score_wife 1.048 0 1.521
Number of observations (households) 1061 (524)
(1) All amounts are in 2003 dollars
(2) annual growth rates are reported
(3) The number of observations takes into account that the estimation of the Euler equation requires at least
two observations per household
a This is defined as the average of the husband’s and wive’s mortality rate (see Eq. 11a)
Table 4 Equivalised total consumption per household across years (in 2003 dollars)
Year No. obs. Total consumption Nondurables consumption Nondurables consumption
(Salm 2010 categories)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2001 583 25,669 20,064 25,359 19,605 7302 5339
2003 747 24,955 20,686 24,619 20,298 7134 5640
2005 826 22,723 18,155 22,440 17,968 6997 5229
2007 872 22,789 18,738 22,400 18,403 6758 5393
2009 664 20,684 17,500 20,125 17,312 5719 4821
Number of observations (households): 3692 (1154)
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Table 5 The proportion of
households with consumption
greater than, or equal to, annuity
income by age groups and years
Age class Mean No. obs. Mean No. obs.
2001 2003
65–69 0.649 154 0.606 158
70–74 0.673 141 0.639 177
75–79 0.63 156 0.582 175
80–83 0.649 102 0.686 162
85+ 0.657 30 0.723 75
2005 2007
65–69 0.528 178 0.543 180
70–74 0.453 203 0.548 215
75–79 0.61 187 0.6 215
80–83 0.603 164 0.596 157
85+ 0.638 94 0.622 105
2009 2001–2009
65–69 0.426 89 0.562 759
70–74 0.503 165 0.556 901
75–79 0.516 180 0.588 913
80–83 0.592 135 0.623 720
85+ 0.6 95 0.641 399
In case of couples age is of the
respondent who answered the
questions about the household
consumption
(see Fig. 1). We test this prediction by regressing the logarithm of total consumption
minus logarithm of annuity income on age, initial wealth and health characteristics.
The estimation results of this regression for singles in Table 6, first column, show that
the coefficient of wealth is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the
higher the level of wealth, the larger the difference between total consumption and
annuity income is. In other words, singles are more likely to spend more than their
annuity income and this additional spending is higher for those who enter retirement
with more (initial) wealth. The results also indicate a significant age effect after con-
trolling for year-of-birth cohort effects. As individuals draw down their wealth after
retirement, their total consumption converges to annuity income at advanced ages as
predicted by the model of Hurd (see Fig. 1). Another interesting finding is the higher
educated have a larger difference between total consumption and annuity income.
The bottom of the table (the Wald test) shows that the health variables are jointly
significant at a 5% level. Specifically, being in poor health significantly increases total
consumption relative to annuity income, which could be because total consumption
includes health expenditures. In support of this explanation, the results in the second
column of Table 6 show that the logarithm of total health expenditures is signifi-
cantly higher for those who are in poor health. Once health expenditures are excluded
from total expenditures, the difference between total consumption and annuity income
becomes independent of individuals’ health status.7 The results in the second column
suggest as well that the logarithm of total health expenditures becomes higher as
7 Results are available upon request.
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Table 6 Explaining differences between consumption and annuity income, one-person households
Model (1) (2)
Log total consumption
minus log annuity income
Log total health expenditures




Wealth (in $10,000) 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
CES-D score 0.014 0.012
(0.011) (0.016)
Poor health 0.110∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.045) (0.079)
Good health 0.016 −0.088
(0.041) (0.061)
Any ADL limitations 0.008 0.046
(0.049) (0.085)
Any IADL limitations 0.04 −0.011
(0.041) (0.066)




Number of observations (households) 1995 (646) 1941(645)
Wald test all health variables, p value 0.015 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
the level of education increases. An explanation for this latter finding might be that
although high educated individuals are usually healthier than low educated individu-
als, hence have less spending on health, low-income individuals in the United States
are covered by a social health care program called Medicaid whereas high-income
individuals are not and may, therefore, have relatively higher out-of-pocket expendi-
tures.
Similar to findings for singles, Table 7 shows that for couples the level of initial
wealth is positively associated with the difference between total consumption and
annuity income. The age effect in this model is not as strong as in the singles model.
Neither the age of husband nor the age of wife has a significant effect on the difference
between total consumption and annuity income. One explanation can be that couple
households are usually younger than single person households and, therefore, they may
have a flatter consumption profile. The p-value of the Wald test for health variables
at the bottom of the table shows that the health variables have jointly insignificant
effects.
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Table 7 Explaining differences between consumption and annuity income,two-person households
Model (1) (2)
Log total consumption
minus log annuity income
Log total health expenditures
Year of birth husband 0.001 −0.057
(0.03) (0.05)
Year of birth wife −0.016 0.038
(0.03) (0.05)
Age husband −0.001 −0.056
(0.03) (0.05)
Age wife −0.01 0.046
(0.03) (0.05)
Wealth (in $10,000) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Cesd score husband 0.003 −0.022
(0.01) (0.03)
Cesd score wife −0.008 −0.029
(0.01) (0.02)
Any IADL limitations husband 0.021 −0.031
(0.04) (0.06)
Any IADL limitations wife −0.051 −0.049
(0.04) (0.07)
Poor health husband 0.053 0.138∗∗
(0.05) (0.07)
Poor health wife 0.01 −0.042
(0.05) (0.08)
Good health husband −0.024 −0.03
(0.04) (0.06)
Good health wife −0.002 −0.066
(0.04) (0.06)
Any ADL limitations husband 0.115∗ 0.01
(0.06) (0.10)
Any ADL limitations wife 0.072 0.027
(0.06) (0.09)
Years of education husband 0.01 0.027∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)




Number of observations (households) 1617 (524) 1606 (524)
Wald test on all health variables, p value 0.342 0.351
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Next, we investigated the extent to which individuals’ subjective mortality risk is
associated with consumption growth at older ages. We first estimate the Euler equation
as shown in Eq. (5) where consumption growth is explained by subjective mortality
risk of elderly singles. In the first two models of Table 8 we have used all categories
of nondurables whereas in the last two models we only included seven categories
of nondurables as suggested by Salm (2010) (see Sect. 3.2). Also following Salm
(2010), we included health indicators in levels in models (2) and (4). To allow for the
possibility that individuals’ marginal utility of consumption is affected by their health
status (Börsch-Supan and Stahl 1991) we as well estimated models in which changes
in individuals’ health status are controlled for. Note that all explanatory variables are
measured in the year between t and t + 1 and, therefore, exogenous in the sense that
they are not correlated with the error term in year t + 1.
According this table, in all specifications the coefficient of subjective mortality
risk has an expected sign but is only in model (4) statistically significant at the 10%
level. The size of this latter estimate shows that an increase in subjective mortality by
1% point is associated with a decrease in consumption of about 0.34%. This estimate
corresponds to a parameter of relative risk aversion which is equal to 2.9 which is in
line with previous estimates in the literature (see, e.g. Skinner 1985; Palumbo 1999).
While our findings suggest that consumption growth based on a subset of goods is lower
for individuals with higher subjective mortality rates, as predicted by the life cycle
model outlined in Sect. 2.1, subjective mortality risk does not explain consumption
growth when based on all categories of nondurables. This may be because some of
these categories such as home insurance, property tax, rent, electricity and water are
not, or very slowly, adjusted in response to changes in the mortality risk.
The results in the fourth column also suggest that the growth rate of nondurable
consumption is higher for the individuals who have any limitations in activities of
daily living such as eating, bathing, walking etc. In other words, these individuals’
current (nondurable) expenditures are smaller than their future expenditures. A reason
for this finding can be that individuals who have limitations in daily activities would
spend more money on health services and medical supplies and less money on other
categories such as food, dining out, vacations and hobbies. The Salm (2010) categories
of nondurables in model (4) exclude expenditures on health; therefore, we may find
that the current expenditures on non-health related categories are lower for unhealthy
individuals.
Table 9 shows for couples that although the coefficient on the couple’s mortality
rate has an expected sign in the first two models, it is not statistically significant. For
the last two models we find an unexpected sign for the coefficient on the couple’s
mortality rate, yet these estimates are as well not statistically different from zero.
The control variables also do not seem to play a role in determining the growth rate
of consumption of elderly couples. Overall, these findings are not in support of the
theoretical model for couples derived in Sect. 2.
4.1 Sensitivity Checks
Salm (2010) has suggested to instrument subjective mortality rate to account for mea-
surement error that may be the result of rounding or focal point responses. Following
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Salm (2010), we have used mother’s age at death as an instrument as well as the
respondent’s life table mortality rate.8 According to the first stage results in columns
(2) and (4) of Table 10, life table mortality rate is strongly correlated with subjective
mortality rate. The Hansen’s J statistics at the bottom of the table suggest that the
(overidentifying) instruments are exogenous in the sense that they are not correlated
with the error term of the consumption growth equation. The partial F-statistics for
models (2) and (4) are quite high (more than 10) which suggests sufficient strength of
the relationship between subjective mortality rate and the additional instruments in the
first stage regressions. The last row in this table reports Wooldridge’s (1995) robust
score test statistic to determine whether the subjective mortality rate can be consid-
ered exogenous. The outcome of this test indicates that exogeneity of the subjective
mortality rate cannot be rejected which suggests that IV estimation is not needed and
we may rely on the OLS results of Table 8.
Table 11 shows the IV estimation results of the Euler equation for couples. We
instrument the couple’s mortality rate with the couple’s mortality rate based on indi-
vidual mortality rates from life tables. We do not use mother’s age at death as an
instrument because it did not significantly predict couple’s mortality risk. According
to the first stage results in columns (2) and (4), the couple’s mortality risk obtained
from the life table is strongly correlated with the couple’s mortality rate based on
subjective mortality risks of the husband and the wife. The second stage results in
columns (1) and (3) show that the coefficients on the couple’s adjusted mortality rate
have the expected positive sign, yet they are not statistically significant. In line with
the estimation results in Table 9 we find that the prediction of the life-cycle model for
elderly couples does not hold even after accounting for measurement error in subjective
survival probabilities of the husband and the wife.
5 Conclusions
Previous studies have found that individuals do not draw down their assets after retire-
ment which is at odds with the predictions of a simple life cycle model without
uncertainty. Hurd (1989, 1999) explain saving behavior of elderly singles and couples
by adding lifetime uncertainty and bequest motives to the simple life cycle model.
We have tested in this paper the predictions of the models proposed by Hurd (1989,
1999) for elderly Americans using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
supplemented with data from the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS).
We found that more than half of the individuals in our sample spend more than their
annuity income after retirement which indicates most individuals have decreasing
wealth profiles in old age as predicted by the theory. Moreover, we found that the
difference between total consumption and annuity income increases with the level of
wealth for both elderly singles and couples. We found for single person households that
the growth rate of consumption expenditures on sub-categories of nondurables is lower
for individuals with higher subjective mortality rates. The subjective mortality risk does
8 We found that father’s age of death does not significantly predict individuals’ subjective mortality risk
and to avoid using too many insignificant instruments we therefore did not use it.
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not, however, explain the growth rate of consumption expenditures on all categories
of nondurables and this may be because some of these expenditure categories such
as home insurance, property tax, rent, electricity, water or heating are not adjusted
in response to changes in mortality risk. The growth rate of consumption of elderly
couples does not depend on their mortality risk, contrary to the theoretical prediction.
A possible explanation for this latter finding is that the assumption of the model
regarding the same coefficient of relative risk aversion for both spouses may not be
supported by the empirical evidence since women tend to be more risk averse than
men in financial decision-making (see, e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009).
Overall this paper has presented some empirical evidence in favor of wealth decu-
mulation by the elderly after retirement. Future research can, for instance, explore an
extension of the life cycle model for couples by assuming a different coefficient of
relative risk aversion for the husband and the wife. This may as well require, in contrast
to what we did, estimating the risk aversion parameters. In addition, the importance
of the assumption that the death of the husband is independent of the death of the
wife should be further investigated. Another extension of our model would be adding
additional uncertainty to the model such as uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical
expenses which could be an important factor to explain savings of the elderly in the
United States.
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